

**PSC 781: Politics of the Developing World<sup>1</sup>**  
**Fall 2022**

Tuesdays, 9:30-12:15  
Eggers Hall 225B

**Professor:** Erin Hern

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**Office:** 400B Eggers Hall

**Office Hours:** T 2:30-3:30PM / Th 10-11AM / Zoom by appointment

**Course Description:**

This course considers the specific challenges of governing in poorer countries. The course begins by interrogating whether “developing world” is a useful concept. It continues by considering questions related to the shared history and prospects of poorer countries, including the legacies of colonialism, development of nationalism, theory and practice of democracy, persistence of authoritarianism, strategies for economic growth, resource curses, the politics of foreign aid, and political violence.

**Objectives:**

1. Gain familiarity with what unites the “developing world” politically as well as an appreciation for the diversity within it.
2. Understand how the theories of comparative politics apply to—or must be adapted to—lower-income countries.
3. Demonstrate expertise in at least one area of comparative politics as it relates to the developing world.

**Course Requirements and Grading:**

Memos (4)	25%
Participation	25%
Final Paper	50%

Four times over the course of the semester, you will write a memo synthesizing the main arguments of the week’s readings. Memo-writers for the week will also act as discussion leaders. Your memos should respond to some or all of the questions posed in the week’s topic description, and should identify debates, controversies, or unanswered questions for discussion in class. Memos must address at least 2 of the week’s readings directly. Submission of these memos and participation in class (through leading and participating in discussion) constitute 50% of your total grade.

At the end of the semester, you will produce **either** a literature review or a research design. A literature review summarizes the state of the literature on a particular topic, identifying emerging points of consensus, ongoing debates, and new areas of exploration. A research design identifies an interesting and relevant question related to one of the course topics, presents hypotheses informed by the literature, and proposes a design and method for adjudicating between the hypotheses. The research design may be ambitious, but should be feasible with funding. Note that in either case, you will be expected to review literature beyond the sources included on the syllabus. Literature reviews and research designs should be 15-20 pages, not including works cited. This project should be useful for you in your course of study; I encourage you to select a topic related to your (likely) thesis or prospectus topic.

Class participation is a significant portion of your grade. If extenuating circumstances prevent you from attending multiple sessions, **please communicate with me** so we can make a plan for moving forward.

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<sup>1</sup> I did not choose the name of this course. The term “developing world” and the concepts it invokes are contested, and we will discuss this terminology and its usefulness in class.

## COURSE POLICIES

### Course Format:

This course is in-person, but students may attend remotely if mildly ill or quarantined. Please contact me at least **one hour before class** if you need the Zoom option. Similarly, course format may shift to Zoom if I am mildly ill or quarantined.

### Zoom Etiquette

Remote learning is most effective when all participants can see each other, and therefore I ask that you turn your camera on if you need to attend via Zoom. If you do not have a camera or have reservations about this policy, please let me know. Please treat Zoom class as you would an in-person class: come fully clothed and be sure nothing is in view of your camera that you do not want to share. Feel free to use a virtual or blurred background to maintain privacy. In general, these sessions will not be recorded; if that changes, I will always warn you in advance of recording.

### Late Work:

I do not accept late work in this class. Memos are due prior to the class period in which we are discussing the readings; late submissions defy the purpose of the assignment. It is far better to submit something incomplete than nothing at all. Extensions are possible for the final paper under extenuating circumstances, but will likely require filing “incomplete” paperwork given that I will be on leave shortly after the last class.

## UNIVERSITY POLICIES

### Academic Integrity:

Syracuse University’s Academic Integrity Policy holds students accountable for the integrity of the work they submit. Students should be familiar with the policy and know that it is their responsibility to learn about course-specific expectations, as well as about university policy. The university policy governs appropriate citation and use of sources, the integrity of work submitted in exams and assignments, and the veracity of signatures on attendance sheets and other verification of participation in class activities. The policy also prohibits students from submitting the same written work in more than one class without receiving written authorization in advance from both instructors. The presumptive penalty for a first offense by an undergraduate student is course failure, accompanied by a transcript notation indicating that the failure resulted from a violation of Academic Integrity Policy. The standard sanction for a first offense by a graduate student is suspension or expulsion. For more information and the complete policy, see <http://academicintegrity.syr.edu>.

### Disability Related Accommodations:

If you believe that you need accommodations for a disability, please contact the Office of Disability Services (ODS), <http://disabilityservices.syr.edu>, located in Room 309 of 804 University Avenue, or call (315) 443-4498, TDD: (315) 443-1371 for an appointment to discuss your needs and the process for requesting accommodations. ODS is responsible for coordinating disability-related accommodations and will issue students with documented Disabilities Accommodation Authorization Letters, as appropriate. Since accommodations may require early planning and generally are not provided retroactively, please contact ODS as soon as possible.

### Religious Observances:

SU religious observances notification and policy, found at <http://hendricks.syr.edu/spiritual-life/index.html>, recognizes the diversity of faiths represented among the campus community and protects the rights of students, faculty, and staff to observe religious holidays according to their tradition. Under the policy, students are provided an opportunity to make up any examination, study, or work requirements that may be missed due to a religious observance provided they **notify their instructors before the end of the second week of classes for regular session classes** and by the submission deadline for flexibly formatted classes. An online notification process is available for students in **My Slice / StudentServices / Enrollment / MyReligiousObservances / Add a Notification**.

## COURSE SCHEDULE

Note that our last class, 12/6, is designated as a flex day. In case of extenuating circumstances, this date will move earlier in the semester. I will communicate any schedule changes via Blackboard announcement.

Most of the readings below are available through the SU library. Readings marked with an \* are available as PDFs on Blackboard.

Suggested readings are optional and are offered as a jumping off point for students interested in a particular topic. Lists of suggested reading are not comprehensive. Some lists are longer than others—that reflects my interests and expertise, not importance within the field.

### ***PART 1: WHAT IS POLITICALLY DIFFERENT ABOUT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?***

#### **8/30 (Week 1) What is the developing world?**

Ba, Oumar. 2022. "The Europeans and Americans Don't Know Africa": Of Translation, Interpretation, and Extraction," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*

Rodrik, Dani. 2003. *In Search of Prosperity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Introduction.

Kabeer, Naila. 2015. "Gender, Poverty, and Inequality: A brief history of feminist contributions in the field of international development," *Gender & Development* 23(2): 189-205.

North, Douglass C. 1991. "Institutions." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 5(1): 97-112.

#### **9/6 (Week 2) Colonial Legacies: Institutions + Economic Development**

Does it matter if states were formed endogenously, through the threat of violence, or exogenously, through colonialism? How does this history of state formation influence the subsequent development of governing institutions? What are the political and economic institutional legacies of colonialism, specifically?

\*Tilly, Charles. 1992. "How War Made States, and Vice Versa." In his *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 67-95

Nunn, Nathan. 2009. "The Importance of History in Economic Development," *Annual Review of Economics* 1: 65-92.

Dell, Melissa. 2010. "The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita." *Econometrica* 78(6): 1863-1903.

Iyer, Lakshmi. (2010). "Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(4): 693-713.

#### *Suggested Reading*

Carneiro, Robert L. 1970. "A Theory of the Origin of the State," *Science* 169 (August): 733-738.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson & James Robinson. (2001). "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91(5): 1369-1401.

Engerman, Stanley and Kenneth Sokoloff. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies" *NBER Working Paper 9259*

Lee, Alexander & Kenneth Schultz. (2012). "Comparing British and French Colonial Legacies: A Discontinuity Analysis of Cameroon." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7: 1-46.

- Doner, Richard F., Bryan K. Ritchie, and Dan Slater. 2005. "Systemic vulnerability and the origins of developmental states: Northeast and Southeast Asia in comparative perspective." *International Organization* 59(2): 327-361.
- Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review* 101(7):
- de la Sierra, Raul. (2020). "On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo." *Journal of Political Economy*.
- Huillery, Elise. (2009). "History matters: The long-term impact of colonial public investments in French West Africa." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 1(2): 176-215.
- Mattingly, Daniel C. (2017). "Colonial Legacies and State Institutions in China: Evidence From a Natural Experiment." *Comparative Political Studies* 50(4): 434-463.
- Lee, Alexander. (2019). "Land, State Capacity, and Colonialism: Evidence From India." *Comparative Political Studies*. 52(3): 412-444.

### **9/13 (Week 3) Colonial Legacies: Divided States**

What are the social consequences of living in states created through colonialism rather than other forms of violence? What happens when "artificial states" group together people who do not share the same view of the nation? How do precolonial institutions affect sub-national performance?

\*Geertz, Clifford. "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in *The Interpretation of Cultures* pgs. 255-279.

Alesina, Easterly, Matuszewski, 2011. "Artificial States." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 9(1): 246-277.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2001. "Ethnic bargains, group instability, and social choice theory." *Politics & Society* 29(3): 337-362.

Wilfarht, Martha. 2018. "Precolonial Legacies and Institutional Congruence in Public Goods Delivery: Evidence from Decentralized West Africa," *World Politics* 70(2):239-74

#### *Suggested Readings*

Miguel, Edward. 2004. "Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania." *World Politics*. Vol.56 pp.327-362.

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphries, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101: 709-725.

Posner, Daniel N. 2004. "The political salience of cultural difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi." *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 529-545.

Selway, Joel S. 2011. "The Measurement of Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Other Multidimensional Cleavage Structures." *Political Analysis* 19(1): 48-65.

## ***PART 2: POLITICS AND POLITICAL CULTURE***

### **9/20 (Week 4) Democracy in Lower-Income Countries**

Is there something inherently different about how democracy functions in lower-income countries? How, and in what way, might high levels of poverty and inequality affect democracy? How, if at all, does democracy affect economic performance and inequality? In other words, how does economic performance affect democracy, and how does democracy affect economic performance?

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53(1): 69-105.

Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics* 49(2): 155-183.

Boix, Carles. 2011. "Democracy, Development, and the International System." *American Political Science Review* 105(4): 809-28.

Debs, Alexandre, and Gretchen Helmke. 2010. "Inequality under Democracy: Explaining the Left Decade in Latin America." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 5(3): 209-41.

Murshed, Syed et al. 2020. "Fiscal Capacity, Democratic Institutions and Social Welfare Outcomes in Developing Countries," *Defense and Peace Economics* 33(3): 280-305.

#### *Suggested Reading*

Johnson, Noel D. & Mark Koyama. (2017). "States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints." *Explorations in Economic History* 64: 1-20.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared. 2009. "Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 56: 1043-1058

### **9/27 (Week 5) Democracy in Divided Societies**

Many countries with colonial histories struggle with deep social divisions. What is the best way to design democratic institutions in such places? Is it better to enshrine difference in the institutions, or design institutions that overcome differences? Can constitutional engineering enable functional democracy in deeply divided societies?

Horowitz, Donald. 1993. "The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict: Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 4(4):18-38.

Lijphart, Arend. 2004. "Constitutional Design for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 15(2):96-109.

Reilly, Ben. 2002. "Electoral Systems for Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 156-170.

Ejobowah, John. 2008. "Integrationist and accommodationist measures in Nigeria's constitutional engineering: Successes and failures," in Sujit Chaudhry, ed. *Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation?* Oxford UP.

#### *Suggested Reading*

Haddad, Simon. 2009. "Lebanon: From Consociationalism to Conciliation," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 15(3-4): 398-416.

### **10/4 (Week 6) Forms of Accountability: Patronage and Programmatic Politics**

How do citizens hold elected officials accountable in countries with newer, less programmatic democracies? Is accountability possible in countries with non-programmatic politics? Are programmatic political linkages always preferable to clientelist linkages?

Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities," *Comparative Political Studies* 33:845-879.

Stokes, Susan C. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 315-25.

Thachil, Tariq. 2011. "Embedded Mobilization: Nonstate Service Provision as Electoral Strategy in India." *World Politics* 63(3): 434-69.

Jost, Prisca and Ellen Lust. (Forthcoming). "Receiving More, Expecting Less? Social Ties, Clientelism, and the Poor's Expectations of Future Service Provision," *World Development*  
DOI:10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.106008

Hicken, Allen, & Noah L. Nathan. (2020). "Clientelism's Red Herrings: Dead Ends and New Directions in the Study of Nonprogrammatic Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 23: 277-294.

#### *Suggested Reading:*

Lindberg, Staffan. 2010. "What Accountability Pressures do MPs in Africa face and How Do They Respond?" *Journal of Modern African Studies* 48(1): 117-142.

Gottlieb, Jessica (Working Paper) "Keeping the State Weak to Prevent Programmatic Claim-Making in Young Democracies."

Goyal, Tanushree. (Working Paper) "Do Citizens Enforce Accountability for Public Goods Provision? Evidence from India's Rural Roads Program."

Khemani, Stuti. (2015). "Buying votes versus supplying public services: Political incentives to under-invest in pro-poor policies." *Journal of Development Economics* 117: 84-93.

### **10/11 (Week 7) Western Hegemony, "Democracy," and Political Culture**

Is democracy universally and objectively the best form of governance, or is it a Western concept? Who defines democracy, and what are the implications thereof? Can other forms of "political culture" produce better outcomes, or is "culture" just a justification for authoritarianism?

Bush, Sarah. 2017. "The Politics of Rating Freedom: Ideological Affinity, Private Authority, and the Freedom in the World Ratings," *Perspectives on Politics* 15(3): 711-731.

Robison, Richard. 1996. "The Politics of 'Asian Values,'" *The Pacific Review* 9(3):309-27.

Thompson, Mark R. 2015. "Democracy with Asian Characteristics," *Journal of Asian Studies* 74(4):875-887.

Ake, Claude. 1993. "The Unique Case of African Democracy," *International Affairs* 69(2):239-244.

### ***PART 3: POLITICAL ECONOMY***

#### **10/18 (Week 8) Taxation**

The ability to raise revenue through taxation is fundamental to both building and maintaining state capacity, but tax regimes in poorer countries are often underdeveloped and poorly enforced. Why is it so hard to tax in poorer countries? What are the implications for state capacity and the fiscal contract?

Levi, Margaret. 1988. "The Theory of Predatory Rule." Chapter 2 in her *Of Rule and Revenue*. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 11-40.

Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson. 2014. "Why do Developing States Tax so Little?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 28(4): 99-120

Morrison, Kevin M. 2014. "Taxation Leads to Instability, Not Representation." Chapter 2 in *Nontaxation and Representation: The Fiscal Foundations of Political Stability*. New York: Cambridge UP.

Christensen, Darin and Francisco Garfias. 2021. "The Politics of Property Taxation: Fiscal Infrastructure and Electoral Incentives in Brazil," *Journal of Politics* 83(4): 1399-1416.

#### *Suggested*

Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. "Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa," *American Political Science Review* 101(1): 159-172.

Besley, Timothy & Torsten Persson (2009). "The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics." *American Economic Review* 99(4): 1218-44

### **10/25 (Week 9) Non-tax Revenue and Resource Curses**

Many developing countries rely on non-tax revenue from resource rents or foreign aid. What are the political implications of reliance on non-tax revenue? How does it impact the development of the fiscal contract and government accountability? How does it impact stability and political and economic access?

Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53 (3): 325-361.

Goldberg, Ellis, Erik Wibbels, and Eric Mvukiyehe. 2008. "Lessons from Strange Cases: Democracy, Development, and the Resource Curse in the U.S. States." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4-5): 477-514.

Moss, Todd, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas van de Walle. 2006. "An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in sub-Saharan Africa," Center for Global Development Working Paper #74.

Morrison, Kevin M. 2009. "Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributive Foundations of Regime Stability." *International Organization* 63: 107-38.

Kang, Alice. 2009. "Studying Oil, Islam, and Women as if Political Institutions Mattered," *Politics & Gender* 5(4): 560-568.

#### *Suggested Reading*

Ross, Michael. 2008. "Oil, Islam, and Women," *American Political Science Review* 10(1):107-123

### **11/1 (Week 10) Service Provision and Distributive Politics**

Public services are often woefully under-provided in poorer countries. Under what conditions do governments provide better services? With limited resources, how do governments decide which groups to target? What are the political implications of uneven service provision?

Grossman, Guy and Tara Slough. 2022. "Government Responsiveness in Developing Countries," *Annual Review of Political Science* 25: 131-53.

\*Raffler, Pia, Daniel N. Posner, and Doug Parkerson. (2020 Working Paper). “Can Citizen Pressure be Induced to Improve Public Service Provision?”

Tsai, Lily. 2007. “Solidary groups, informal accountability, and local public goods provision in rural China.” *American Political Science Review* 101(2): 355–372

Briggs, Ryan. 2021. “Power to which people? Explaining how electrification targets voters across party rotations in Ghana,” *World Development* DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105391

### *Suggested*

Raffler, Pia. Forthcoming. “Does Political Oversight of Bureaucracy Increase Accountability? Field Experimental Evidence from a Dominant Party Regime,” *American Political Science Review* DOI: 10.1017/S0003055422000181

Golden, Miriam and Brian Min. 2013. “Distributive Politics Around the World,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 16:73-99.

Hern, Erin. 2019. *Developing States, Shaping Citizenship: Service Delivery and Political Participation in Zambia*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press

## **11/8 (Week 11) State Capacity and Decentralization**

Decentralization is may help low-capacity or divided governments perform better, or they may enable central governments to renege on their responsibilities and contribute to uneven government performance. When is decentralization helpful and when is it harmful? Does it bolster or undermine state capacity?

Faguet, Jean-Paul. 2014. “Decentralization and Governance,” *World Development* 53:2-13.

Kosec, Katrina, and Tewodaj Mogues. 2020. “Decentralization without Democracy.” *World Politics* 72(2): 165-213.

Molina-Garzón, Adriana, Tara Grillos, Alan Zarychta, and Krister P. Andersson. (2021). “Decentralization Can Increase Cooperation among Public Officials.” *American Journal of Political Science*.

Wilfahrt, Martha. 2018. “The Politics of Local Government Performance: Elite Cohesion and Cross-Village Constraints in Decentralized Senegal,” *World Development* 103:149-161.

### *Suggested*

Mattingly, Daniel C. 2016. “Elite capture: How decentralization and informal institutions weaken property rights in China.” *World Politics* 68(3): 383-412.

## **PART 4: VIOLENCE**

### **11/15 (Week 12) Political Violence**

Why do elections sometimes devolve into violence? Who perpetrates it, and under what conditions is political violence more likely? What is the impact of electoral or other forms of political violence on political behavior? What do these different country cases tell us about electoral violence generally?

Birch, Sarah, Ursula Daxecker, and Kristine Höglund. 2020. “Electoral violence: An introduction.” *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1): 1-14.



Wahman, Michael and Edward Goldring. 2020. "Pre-election violence and territorial control: Political dominance and subnational election violence in polarized African electoral systems," *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1):93-110.

Daxecker, Ursula. 2020. "Unequal votes, unequal violence: Malapportionment and election violence in India." *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1): 156-170.

Gutiérrez-Romero, Roxana and Adrienne LeBas. 2020. "Does electoral violence affect vote choice and willingness to vote? Conjoint analysis of a vignette experiment," *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1): 77-92.

Condra, Luke N., James D. Long, Andrew C. Shaver & Austin L. Wright. (2018). "The Logic of Insurgent Electoral Violence." *American Economic Review* 108(11): 3199-3231.

*Suggested*

Von Borzyskowski, Inken, & Patrick M. Kuhn. 2020. "Dangerously informed: Voter information and pre-electoral violence in Africa." *Journal of Peace Research* 57(1): 15-29.

### **11/29 (Week 13) Intrastate Conflict**

Why are poorer countries more prone to civil conflict? Which countries are most at risk of conflict? Is it possible to disentangle the impact of poverty from colonial and Cold War legacies? What are the political impacts of civil conflict?

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin (2003). "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90

Weinstein, Jeremy. 2005. "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 598-624

Cohen, Dara K and Sabrina Karim. 2022. "Does More Equality for Women Mean Less War? Rethinking Sex and Gender Inequality in Political Violence," *International Organization* 76(2):414-44

De Juan, Alexander and Jan Henryk Pierskalla. 2016. "Civil War Violence and Political Trust: Microlevel evidence from Nepal," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33(1): 67-88.

*Suggested*

Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Laia Balcells. 2010. "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 104(3): 415-29.

Hadziv, Dino and Margit Tavits. 2019. "The Gendered Effects of Violence on Political Engagement," *The Journal of Politics* 81(2): 676-80.

Curtice, Travis B. "Rebels and the Regime: The Politics of Civilian Victimization." *Journal of Global Security Studies*, June 2021, Vol. 6(2) oga025.

### **12/6 Flex Day**

**Final Papers Due 12/6 (subject to change if the schedule changes)**