Working Paper. When do Autocratizing Incumbents Lose Elections? An Analysis of the Universe of Cases (with Marc Jacob) Why do some autocratizing incumbents lose re-election while others remain in power? Existing research focuses on why voters continue to support anti-democratic leaders but offers little insight into when and why they are removed. We analyze 113 elections since 1990 in which an autocratizing incumbent sought re-election, combining large-N analysis, qualitative coding of the nature of autocratizing acts, and comparative case studies of Zambia and Poland. We find that incumbents who undermine vertical constraints are more likely to survive in office, while strong judicial oversight correlates with electoral defeat. Highly public and visible forms of autocratization increase the likelihood of removal, particularly after an episode of authoritarian consolidation. In both democratic and competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition mobilization plays a crucial role in organizing and reinforcing electoral backlash after an episode of autocratization. Our findings highlight the importance of regime context and opposition strategies in conditioning electoral responses to autocratization.
Working Paper. Transparency Reforms in Mineral-Exporting Countries: When do Leaders Tie their Hands?
Data Collection. The Green Energy Transition and the Politics of Resource Governance in Africa